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Children's Understanding of
Intentions, Emotions, and
Intention-Emotion Relationships
Kathleen Grace Haver
and Elaine M. Justice
Old Dominion University
ABSTRACT
This study examined children's
understanding of the role of intentionality
in social interactions. Four, six, and eight
year olds were read stories, illustrated with
simple pictures, depicting accidental or
deliberate actions. The study used a forced
choice paradigm that asked children to
indicate which of two pictures showed (1)
an intentional (or unintentional) act and (2)
a situation in which the victim would be
sad (or mad). Six and eight year olds, but
not Four year olds, correctly identified
deliberate actions at above chance levels.
Eight year olds identified accidental actions
and situations in which the victim would be
mad at above chance. Understanding that
anger was an expected emotional response
to intentional harm, but not to accidental
harm, increased with age.
INTRODUCTION
This study investigated children's
understanding of intentions, emotions, and
the relation of other people's intentions to
people's emotional responses.
Understanding of intention is an aspect of a
child's "theory of mind", which is the
understanding a child has of his or her own
and other's minds and the relation between
the mind and the world (Astington, 1991).
This understanding allows children to
predict and explain actions by referring to
their own and others' mental states. These
mental states include beliefs, desires, and
intentions (Astington, 1991).
Astington (1991) stated that the
child's "theory of mind" develops
gradually from infancy through school age;
however, the greatest change occurs at age
four. Recent studies indicate that, in
contrast to younger children, Four year
olds demonstrate increased understanding
of a variety of mental states, including

belief, desire, and intentions (Astington &
Gopnik, 1991; Perner, 1988; Perner,
Leekam, & Wimmer, 1987). Although by
the age of four there has been enormous
development in a child's "theory of mind",
additional understanding emerges during
the school years, including awareness of
the social implications of cognitive states
(Astington & Gopnik, 1991).
An important aspect of "theory of
mind" involves the concept of intention as
a mental state which leads to an intended
action. Several studies suggest that
preschool children have some
understanding of intentionality. Shultz,
Wells, and Sarda (1980) examined
intentionality by having three- to sevenyear-olds look at various situations dealing
with pennies. In some cases the child was
misled and chose the incorrect penny. The
results showed that children as young as
three could tell the difference between their
intended choice and the unintended choice
in which they chose the wrong penny due
to the misleading information. Astington
and Lee (1988) showed that four or fiveyears-olds, but not three-year-olds, could
correctly identify appropriate relationships
between desire and intentions and the
correct emotion for the stated outcome in
the story.
Intentions in social situations add
another dimension in which a child must
understand not only his/her own views but
also another person's actions and the
consequences experienced by others. The
understanding of these social situations
may be more difficult to understand and
therefore develop at a later point than does
the understanding of individual intentions.
Justice, Clarke, Haver, and Cassidy
(1993) looked at three-, Four, and fiveyear-olds. Each child heard eight stories
featuring two children which showed one
child doing something either "by accident"
or "on purpose". This action resulted in the
other child experiencing a negative
consequence. Each child was read a story
and asked to point to the face that showed
the emotion of the victim (sad/mad). The
child was also asked about the
intentionality of the perpetrator in the story.
The results of the study showed that across
ages children more often correctly
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identified accidental actions to be
unintentional than deliberate actions as
intentional. Findings also suggested that,
even at the age of five, children have not
developed the understanding of intentions
in social situations, or if they have, they
are reluctant to indicate that the harmful
action was deliberate.
Several studies suggest that
preschool children have the understanding
that there is a relationship between a
situation and an emotional response.
Michalson and Lewis (1985) showed that
emotions such as happy, sad, and mad are
simple emotions that are understood to
correspond with situations and can, in
turn, be identified through facial
expressions. Furthermore, Michalson and
Lewis (1985) have argued that assessment
of children's understanding of emotion
must take into consideration their lexical
knowledge. It has been found that children
can identify different emotions at an earlier
point than they can label them.
Recent studies have examined
children's understanding of the relation of
other's intentions to an emotional response
to those actions. Barden, Zelko, Duncan,
and Masters (1980) examined whether
kindergarten, third, and sixth graders could
appropriately match an emotional response
to a given scenario. The finding was that
were no age differences for being the target
of aggression. Almost all of the children
indicated that they would be angry first and
sad second.
Michalson and Lewis (1985)
looked at a particular situation and the
facial expression that would likely occur
because of that situation. Children between
two and five years of age, plus a small
group of adults, were given a scenario and
asked to choose the face that the character
would express. In the sad scenario, few
age differences were found between the
three-, Four, and five-year-olds in
choosing the sad face. For the anger
situation, up to 40% of all children,
regardless of age, chose the sad face. In
this task, by age five, children could
identify the emotional characteristics of
certain situations in ways very similar to
adults.

Previous studies examined the
understanding of emotions in situations
where a particular emotion would be
expected. In some situations, however, the
characteristic emotion would depend on
one's interpretation of the situation. Justice
et. al. (1993) examined preschoolers'
interpretations of the accidental and
deliberate actions of others, and the
emotional response of the victim to those
actions. The children in the study were
three-, Four, and five-year-olds. The
results showed children were more likely
to indicate that the victim would be sad
rather than mad in both accidental and
deliberate situations. It was hypothesized
that these findings may have resulted from
children being reluctant to indicate that the
action was deliberate and, in particular, to
indicate that the victim would respond with
anger. The findings of Justice et. al.(1993)
suggest that the understanding of intentionemotion relationships develops over an
extended age range and is more complex
than originally thought.
Several changes in Justice et. al.
(1993) were made to address
methodological problems in the study. The
first change included the way in which the
story was presented. In the current study, a
forced choice format was used in which
intentional and unintentional acts were
portrayed. Control questions were used to
ensure that the child understood the
difference between the two scenarios
presented. Finally, a broader range of ages
was used in order to elicit a clearer
developmental pattern.
It was hypothesized that the
understanding of intention and the expected
emotional responses would increase with
age. Furthermore, it was hypothesized that
the older the child, the more certain he/she
would be of his/her choice. Lastly, it was
hypothesized that understanding of the
relation between perceived intention and
emotional response would increase with
age.
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METHOD
Subjects
The participants in this study were
64 Four, six, and eight year-old children,
with approximately equal numbers of male
and female children at each age. Children
participated with parental permission.
Materials
The materials used were eight
stories, illustrated with simple drawings,
depicting two, same-sex, children in a
social interaction. Each interaction involved
some behavior on the part of one child that
resulted in a negative consequence for the
other child. Four stories involved property
loss which included: losing a balloon; an
ice cream cone falling on the floor, a doll
falling onto the floor, and a house made of
blocks being knocked down. Four stories
involved physical harm: fingers getting
pinched in a window; a ball hitting an arm;
a child falling off a merry-go-round; and a
child being tripped.
In each story the first picture
established the base line. In the next two
pictures the intentionality was established
through the use of word bubbles. In one
picture the perpetrator stated the intention
to harm, while in the other there was a
stated intention not indicating intentional
harm. The last picture showed the outcome
of the actions, which was the same for
both intentions.
Pretest materials included a page
with a picture of both a mad and a sad face.
Also, there were four pictures illustrating a
story in which one child experienced a
negative consequence for his own
intentional and unintentional actions. The
child in the story was playing with a sand
castle and did something deliberately in one
picture and accidentally in another. In one
picture the child kicks down the sand
castle, and in the other, the child trips and
falls on the sand castle. In the final picture,
the sand castle has collapsed.
Also used in the study was a
certainty judgment scale. This scale
consisted of five bar graphs which
increased in height from left to right. The
smallest bar represented the least amount of

certainty, and the largest bar represented
the most amount of certainty.
Procedure
Children were brought into a quiet
room at their school and seated next to the
experimenter. They were told that they
would hear some stories and would be
asked questions about the children in the
stories. The pretest was given to test
whether the child could identify the
emotions of sad (S) or mad (M). This was
done by asking the child to point to a sad
and a mad face. If the child could not
identify the emotions, each face was
explained until the child understood.
Children were also pretested for
their understanding of the difference
between on purpose (OP) and by accident
(BA). The sand castle story, in which a
child experienced a negative consequence
to his own actions, was presented to the
child. Three control questions were asked
to establish if the child could identify the
actions in each picture. The first question
asked what happened in the story . The
next two questions asked the child to point
to the picture that matched the appropriate
word bubble. If the child was incorrect, the
story was read again until the child could
answer the control questions. Then the
child was asked to point to the OP picture
and then point to the BA picture. Also in
the pretest, the child was asked to make
certainty judgments about his/her selections
about intentionality. Each child was shown
a bar graph and was asked to point to the
bar which showed how much the child
believed the intention to be OP or BA,
depending upon the question type.
Following the pretest, the eight
stories were read. After each story, three
control questions were asked. The child
was then asked one intention question (OP
or BA), and one emotion question (M or S)
for each story. There were four possible
combinations of intention/emotion
questions. These combinations included:
OP question asked with a M question; an
OP question asked with a S emotional
question; a BA question asked with a M
question; and, finally, a BA question posed
with a S question. Each child received two
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of each intention/emotion combinations.
The way in which the questions were
asked within each order was random, with
the exception that no two like combinations
were asked in a row. Also, each child was
shown each story only once.
RESULTS
The dependent variables in this
study were the percent correct for each
child on each type of intention question
(OP or BA) and the percent correct on each
type of emotion question (S or M).
Certainty judgments for each question type
were also measured.
Understanding of Intentions

IL Corroct Id.ntlflc Non

An age (3) x sex (2) x intention
question type (2, OP/BA) analysis of
variance was conducted on the percent
correct on OP and BA questions with
repeated measures on the last factor. There
was a significant age effect, E(2,58) =
20.59, 2 < .01, and a significant type
effect, E(1,58) = 10.46, 2< .01. Correct
identification of accidental and deliberate
actions increased with age. Mean percent
correct for deliberate actions was .53, .81,
.90, for four, six, and eight year-olds,
respectively. Mean percent correct for
accidental actions was .48, .60, and .77
for four, six, and eight year olds,
respectively. The number correct for OP
actions was greater than that for BA
actions. Mean percent correct was .75 and
.62 for OP and BA, respectively. As
shown in Figure 1, this tendency increased
with age. However the grade x type
interaction did not reach significance.

0.6

0.ne..n. Action.
-0- AcettontO Action.
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Figure 1. Percent correct identification of OP and BA
actions across age.

An age (3) x sex (2) x intention
question type (2) analysis of the certainty
judgments on OP and BA trials showed a
significant type effect, E(1,58) = 9.02, 12<
0.01. The children were more certain of
their judgment on the OP than the BA
trials. Mean certainty judgments were 4.42
and 3.98 for OP and BA, respectively.
Additional analysis addressed the
question of whether the percent correct
judgments for each age and question type
differed significantly from chance. For the
OP question type, both the six and eight
year olds, but not four year olds, differed
significantly from chance, 1(21) = 2.23 and
2.86, 2 < .05, for six and eight year olds,
respectively. For the BA question type,
only the eight year olds differed
significantly from chance, 1(23) = 2.09,
12<.05.
Understanding of Emotions
An age (3) x sex (2) x emotion
question type (2) analysis of variance was
conducted on the percent correct on
sad/mad questions, with a repeated
measure on the last factor. Results showed
main effects for age, F(2,58) = 3.35, 2<
.05, sex, F(1,58) = 6.72, 2 < .01, and
question type, F(1,58) = 30.54, 2 <.01,
and an age x question type interaction,
E(2,58) = 6.08, 12. < .01. Males scored
higher than females on both mad and sad
questions. Mean scores for males were .72
for mad and .45 for sad, and for females
.62 for mad .34 for sad. The age x
question type interaction resulted from the
finding that scores on mad increased with
age, whereas the scores for sad did not.
This is illustrated in Figure 2.
A binomial test for significant
differences from chance found that only the
eight year olds were significantly different
from chance on the mad questions, /(23) =
2.46, 2 < .05. None of the age graphs
differed from chance on the sad question.
An age (3) x sex (2) x emotion
question type (2, M/S) analysis of variance
of the certainty judgments on emotion
questions showed no significant effects.
Certainty on the emotion questions did not
differ across age or question type.
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BA trials, which included the S,
component did not.
DISCUSSION

t
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Figure 2. Percent correct identification of S and M
responses across age.

Understanding of the IntentionEmotion Relationship
To address children's awareness of
the relation of perceived intention to
emotional response, children's ability to
correctly answer both intention and
emotion questions for each intention
question/emotion question combination
was examined. This analysis addressed
children's ability to correctly choose the
same picture on BA/S and OP/M trials, and
different pictures on BA/M and OP/S trials.

S
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Figure 3. Percent of each intention-emotion trial type
on which children were correct on both intention and
emotion questions.

An age (3) x sex (2) x trial type (4,
BA/S, BA/M, OP/S, OP/M) analysis of
variance with repeated measures on the last
factor was conducted on the percent of
trials on which the child was correct on
both intention and emotion questions.
There was a significant age effect, F(2,58)
= 11.17, a < 0.01, and trial type effect,
f(3,56) - 30.57,12 < .01, and a significant
age x trial interaction, F(6,112) = 3.17,
.01. As illustrated in Figure 3,
performance on both the OP and BA trials,
which included the M component,
increased with age, whereas the OP and

Results of this study indicate that
understanding intention in a social situation
may develop significantly later than
understanding of individual intentionality.
In contrast to previous research
demonstrating preschool understanding of
the intentional or unintentional nature of
behavior, (Astington, 1991), only six and
eight year olds correctly identified
deliberate behavior as intentional at above
chance levels. These data suggest that the
development of children's "theory of
mind" continues well into the grade school
years. Building on initial understanding of
the relation of intentions, beliefs, and
desires to an individual's behavior,
advances in perspective-taking skills
during the early school years may
contribute to an understanding of the role
of others' mental states in their behavior.
The current findings also indicate
that understanding that emotional response
is related to the perceived intentions of
others may follow understanding of
intentionality. Although six and eight year
olds correctly identified intentional
behavior at above chance levels, only eight
year olds were above chance in
identification of anger as the expected
emotional response to deliberate harm.
Although preschool children can identify
simple emotions (Michalson & Lewis,
1985), the ability to infer the expected
emotional response of another in a social
situation appears to develop much later.
Consistent with this is the current finding
that understanding that anger is an expected
emotional response to deliberate, but not
accidental harm, showed significant
developmental increases between four and
eight years of age.
An interesting finding in this study
was that there were no developmental
changes in identification of sadness as a
response to accidental, but not deliberate,
harm. This finding may reflect the fact that
sadness may be an appropriate response to
both deliberate and accidental actions.
Also, findings by Justice, et al. (1993)
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suggest that preschool children are
reluctant to indicate that they or others
would respond with anger, even in a
deliberate harm situation.
A number of additional questions
are posed by these findings. In the current
study, the intentional or unintentional
nature of the behavior was explicitly stated
by the perpetrator. In most everyday
interactions, intentions are implicit and,
therefore, more difficult to identify.
Research on developmental changes in
identification of explicitly or implicitly
intentional behavior are needed. Also,
studies examining understanding of the
mental states of others should be
broadened to include information on
children's understanding of the relation of
emotion to interpersonal cognitions.
Additional studies on emotions including
sadness, happiness, and fear in response to
the perceived intentions or beliefs of others
are needed. Such data would contribute
importantly to understanding the role of
children's "theory of mind" in social
interactions.
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